Possible correlations of multinational military operations and state stability, and application to state building in Iraq by Buls, Nicholas J.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-03
Possible correlations of multinational military
operations and state stability, and application to
state building in Iraq
Buls, Nicholas J.















Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL 
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STATE STABILITY, AND 








 Thesis Advisors:   Thomas Johnson 
























 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 
0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 
hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing 
data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing 
the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing 
this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY  2. REPORT DATE  
March 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:   
Possible Correlations of Multinational Military 
Operations and State Stability, and Application to State 
Building in Iraq  
6. AUTHOR(S)  Nicholas J. Buls, LT USN 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND 
ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING / 
MONITORING 
      AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author 
and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or 
the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT  
This thesis explores the possible correlation between participation by 
emerging states in multinational military coalitions, and increased 
stability of those emerging states. Level of multinational military 
participation is regressed against three metrics of stability; level of 
democracy, occurrence of internal conflict, and occurrence of external 
conflict. Implications of correlations discovered are discussed with respect 
to policy relevance toward state building and reconstruction in Iraq. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 89  
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Multinational Operations, United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, Emerging State Stability, Reconstruction in 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500     Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) 








Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS 




Nicholas J. Buls 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 2002 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES 













 Approved by:  Professor Thomas Johnson  




   Professor Abbas Kadhim  
   Thesis Advisor 
 
 
   
   Professor Harold Trinkunas, PhD 
   Chairman 




























This thesis explores the possible correlation between 
participation by emerging states in multinational military 
coalitions, and increased stability of those emerging 
states. Level of multinational military participation is 
regressed against three metrics of stability; level of 
democracy, occurrence of internal conflict, and occurrence 
of external conflict. Implications of correlations 
discovered are discussed with respect to policy relevance 
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Since the end of the Second World War, the world has 
witnessed two striking events: the mass release of entire 
continents from colonialism, and the rise of the formalized 
international community embodied in the United Nations. 
Regions formerly colonized directly or as client satellites 
of parent powers have, in the last half century, proven to 
be a hot bed of regional conflicts, wars, revolts, and 
disputes. Since its first peacekeeping operation in 1948, 
the United Nations has subsequently performed over 60 
multinational peacekeeping and observation operations1 
Additionally, United States military operations since the 
Second World War have overwhelmingly centered on regional 
conflicts, and have been performed by multinational 
coalitions.  
 The end of the Cold War has brought about a dramatic 
shift in the composition of United Nations and United 
States-led coalitions, namely that participants are 
increasingly the nations that such operations were once 
directed against. Developing nations have participated in 
peacekeeping and multinational operations of increasing 
duration and complexity and in greater numbers. In ongoing 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, nations from Africa 
and South Asia are some of the largest contributors. Ongoing 
U.S.-led coalitions have seen greater and greater 
                     
1 List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1948: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf (March 2009). 
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participation by regional allies in the Middle East, South 
and Central America, and Southeast Asia. Of course, the key 
question concerns the implications of greater numbers of 
emerging states participating in greater numbers of 
multinational coalition operations. Previous literature to 
be discussed in Chapter II concentrates primarily on reasons 
that emerging states choose to participate in such 
operations. This thesis will examine the lasting effects 
that participation may have on those states that do 
participate. 
B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
As the globalization of peace and stability operations 
exposes more and more emerging states to international 
cooperation and the international system, it may be inferred 
that repeated exposure to such an environment may change a 
state over time. What effects repeated exposure to 
cooperative military operations may have on emerging states, 
for good or for ill, may have significant defense and 
foreign policy implications. As such, the major research 
question to be examined in this thesis is whether repeated 
participation in multinational military coalitions shows 
correlation with changes in levels of state stability. 
In response to the major research question, three 
hypotheses may be presented. First, participation in 
multinational military coalitions may have little or no 
bearing on state stability. This hypothesis may be stated to 
be the least likely, as it is difficult to imagine that 
greater exposure by an emerging government to both other 
countries and an overarching international system would have 
no effect whatsoever. The second hypothesis that emerges is 
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that participation in multinational military coalitions 
improves state stability in the majority of metrics that may 
be used to measure state stability. This also is unlikely, 
as many aspects of government and state stability are fairly 
independent both from the mitigation of international 
exposure and from the general state of the armed force.  
 The most likely hypothesis, which will henceforth be 
considered the hypothesis of this thesis, to be proved or 
disproved, is that it is highly likely that participation in 
multinational operations may improve select metrics of state 
stability, but that other metrics may be unaffected.  
C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 As the major research question seeks a correlation 
between the number of multinational military coalitions in 
which a given state participates and a change in that 
state’s stability, the problem lends itself to linear 
regression. 
 In order to determine whether multinational operation 
participation affects some elements of state stability more 
than others do, research will be conducted as a series of 
several single variable linear regressions rather than one 
multivariable regression. A series of regressions, separated 
by individual metrics of stability may identify which 
metrics of stability are affected more than others. 
Separating regression sets by region may also identify 
regional trends or anomalies of possible correlations. 
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D. RELEVANCE 
 The central question of this thesis is of great 
relevance to international affairs. In the U.S.-led 
reconstruction of Iraq, the implications of multinational 
coalition and United Nations operations concerning state 
stability may offer insight as to the nature that 
reconstruction assistance to Iraq’s government should take. 
A major focus of the U.S.-led effort at reconstruction of 
Iraq has been the attempt to create a stable and capable 
government. As such, a correlation between military 
participation in the international community and cohesion of 
an emerging state’s government may have implications for 
what security cooperation efforts and training to Iraq’s 
armed forces may produce the most favorable results for 
Iraq, the United States, and the Gulf region.  
 Additional implications for such a correlation between 
state stability and participation in Multinational Coalition 
Military operations may also be applied to the overarching 
goals of the 2007 U.S. Navy Global Maritime Strategy. The 
2007 strategy places significant emphasis on building 
military capabilities and interoperability of regional 
allies to relieve the global burden on the U.S. Armed 
Forces.  If encouraging emerging states to take ownership of 
their region and become more active as contributors to the 
international community would both provide them with 
benefits and increase stability, the advantage seemingly to 
United States policy would be twofold. Firstly, it would be 
easier to encourage states to take an active role in their 
region if concrete benefits to them can be demonstrated. 
Secondly, increasingly coherent spheres of regional 
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stability benefit the U.S. goals of stable sea and 
commercial lines of communication and reduced commitment of 
U.S. Expeditionary forces. 
E. THESIS CONTENT 
 The thesis will subsequently be broken down into four 
sections. A review of previous literature on the subject of 
multinational operations has been conducted for background 
on the field of study, and it establishes the universally 
accepted benefits that small states may receive from 
multinational operations. The thesis examines the 
participation levels in multinational coalitions between 
1996 and 2008, and participation levels with changes in 
three metrics of stability: democratization, reduction of 
internal conflicts, and reduction of external conflicts. 
Research design for the study will be explained in detail, 
outlining parameters, time period, countries, and 
multinational operations to be included in the study. This 
section will also describe construction of regressions, and 
the specifics of metrics of stability to be used. Actual 
results of the statistical analysis will be described in 
their own section, firstly with the results of regressions 
for all countries as a contiguous block, and then divided by 
region to identify regional trends. Lastly, policy 
implications of the results will be discussed, particularly 
with respect to the historical background of state building 
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II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
 For a cohesive study, a frame of reference for 
multinational military coalitions and their effects on and 
benefits to participants must first be established. Previous 
research has examined in great detail the potential benefits 
to small and emerging states of participating in 
multinational military operations, as well as benefits to 
larger regions provided by formalized international 
organizations. In addition, present in much of the 
literature is the investigation of reasons why states may 
choose to participate. Though this thesis will focus on what 
actual results are brought about by multinational military 
cooperation, beliefs of governments as to what benefits they 
believe they will gain present a starting point for what 
metrics should be investigated. 
 Review of literature on the subject of participation in 
United Nations Peacekeeping and other multinational 
operations reveals a great deal of information on possible 
benefits to small nations incurred through participation in 
such operations. Consistent throughout the literature is the 
concept that small nations with minimal funding may obtain 
equipment, training, and even better pay for their armed 
forces by participating in United Nations-led coalitions. 
Additionally, though information is limited on whether or 
not states may actually receive increased legitimacy through 
participation in United Nations Operations, most literature 
on the subject agrees that the belief in such improvement is 
a key factor encouraging them to participate. A vast 
majority of literature on participation in United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations is also focused on why states choose 
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to participate and factors influencing their decisions. As 
such, information on the benefits to emerging states for 
their participation is presented, but is not the primary 
focus of the studies. Additionally, common throughout most 
of the studies is an apparent bias against states 
participating from self-interest, labeling them as free 
riders or seekers of greater international recognition, 
rather than the acceptance that such benefits to smaller 
states may improve their stability and prevent the need for 
future peacekeeping operations.   
 A useful reference describing why states may choose to 
participate in international coalitions is Ian Hurd’s 
Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics. 
Hurd argues that there are primarily three reasons that 
states will participate in a larger international system, 
namely coercion, self – interest, and altruism.2 Hurd 
describes coercion as “To the extent that states follow any 
international rules, or act as if they recognize any 
international obligations, they do so out of the fear that 
noncompliance may bring a painful sanction.3 Implied in the 
statement is that participation may prevent painful 
sanctions. Additionally, Hurd refers to the example of 
states in the Holy Roman Empire as an example of weak states 
vulnerable to attack who sought to bolster their security 
through association as a part of a larger organization, 
applicable to small states in modern times contemplating 
participation in United Nations-led operations. Though 
Hurd’s article does not specifically address United Nations 
                     
2 Ian Hurd. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” 
International Organization 53 (1999): 379. 
3 Hurd, 394. 
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Peacekeeping, his theories of broader international 
relations provide a framework for theory construction on 
possible effects of small state participation in United 
Nations Operations. 
 Commonly cited in literature on United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations is Laura Neack’s article UN 
Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self? Neack 
examines whether the interest of the stability of the global 
community or self-interest are more likely to influence a 
state’s decision to participate in United Nations 
operations. Neack argues that since the founding of the 
United Nations following the Second World War, many less 
powerful nations, referred to by Neack as the “middle 
nations”4 have participated in United Nations Operations 
primarily to increase their own standing in the 
international community, and preserve their influence by 
contributing to an international system greater than 
stronger national powers. Additionally, Neack argues that 
“even ‘small’ or ‘weak’ powers may support the status quo,”5 
and also cites that three of the largest contributors to 
United Nations Peacekeeping have been India, Ghana, and 
Brazil, rising regional powers wishing to assert greater 
prominence in the international community.6  
 Further developing the reasons why a state participates 
in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and indirectly, 
benefits a small state may reap from participation is Gerry 
Cleaver and Roy May’s Peacekeeping: The African Dimension. 
                     
4 Laura Neack. “UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or 
Self?” Journal of Peace Research 32 (1995): 183. 
5 Neack 184. 
6 Ibid., 185. 
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Cleaver and May seek to determine whether the region of sub-
Saharan Africa would benefit from a firmer establishment of 
a peacekeeping organization of African States. Cleaver and 
May form the hypothesis, based on previous participation in 
United nations Peacekeeping Operations, with significant 
numbers of African nations contributing troops,7 that 
regional stability of Africa would benefit from a more 
formal arrangement of African states for peacekeeping 
operations. Their final conclusion is that while significant 
problems must first be addressed, the region would benefit. 
Sandra Maclean’s Peacebuilding and the New Regionalism in 
Southern Africa. Maclean argues that from the growing number 
of African nations that have gained experience through 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has come a new sense 
of regionalism, creation of multinational regional conflict 
management organizations, and countries taking ownership of 
their region in the international community has emerged.8 
Maclean, of all the articles reviewed, makes a compelling 
argument for the intangible benefits of participation in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, that exposure to 
such operations and repeated participation in the 
international community may lead to the taking on of greater 
responsibility by small and emerging states. 
 Lebovic’s Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations After the Cold War seeks to 
determine the primary cause for state support of United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations; whether a factor of the 
                     
7 Gerry Cleaver and Roy May. “Peacekeeping: The African Dimension.” 
Review of African Political Economy 22 (1995): 490. 
8 Sandra J. Maclean.  “Peacebuilding and the New Regionalism in 
Southern Africa.” Third World Quarterly 20 (1999):  953. 
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level of democracy of the country, or of self interest. 
Lebovic quotes Neack’s suggestion that middle and weaker 
powers may use participation in United Nations Operations to 
bolster their international recognition and influence.9 
Though the article centers, and successfully argues with 
that levels of democracy affect a nation’s likelihood to 
participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in 
the explanation of self-interest, Lebovic’s article also 
indirectly reveals possible benefits to emerging states in 
return for participation.  First, the research suggests that 
small or weak states may obtain significant military 
benefits from participation, chiefly better pay for their 
forces, equipment in the form of excess defense articles, 
and valuable training gained in real world operations for 
their forces.10 Additionally, participation in certain 
operations may gain smaller or emerging nations the support 
of a larger power that may assist them in the future.11 
 A further examination of possible benefits of United 
Nations Peacekeeping operations is provided in Bobrow and 
Boyer’s Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to 
Peacekeeping Operations. Bobrow and Boyer’s study reinforce 
that small states may gain significant materiel and monetary 
benefits for their armed forces by participating in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the article 
cites Neack’s view that participation may result from a 
desire to maintain or enhance status in the international 
community, but calls into question whether or not that is 
                     
9James H. Lebovic.  “Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United 
Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War.” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution  48 (2004) :  911. 
10 Lebovic, 926. 
11 Ibid., 916. 
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necessarily bad. Bobrow and Boyer argue that while self-
interest may be a significant factor leading to 
participation in United nations Peacekeeping Operations, 
greater participation in a legitimate international 
authority, whatever the reasons, may be of benefit to the 
collective good, stating 
In our view, for UN PKO’s and many other aspects 
of international affairs, it seems unhelpful to 
embrace absolute dichotomies – such as purely 
private versus public goods – which fail to 
distinguish intermediate possibilities of 
consequence.12 
Of particular note is that Bobrow and Boyer accept that 
participation in Peacekeeping Operations, even for reasons 
of self-interest, may still be a positive trend. 
 Literature on participation in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations appears to be heavily weighted 
towards the reasons that states participate, and in a trend 
exemplified by Neack seem to ignore that individual benefits 
to small states may be to the advantage of the international 
community. Information on gains to small states is provided, 
as in order to describe reasons of self-interest, many 
articles provide indirect data on benefits small states 
might receive. Several of the articles mention the hard fact 
that small states providing military components to United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations will receive the tangible 
benefits of monetary support, military equipment, and 
valuable real world training for personnel. While not 
specifically investigated as a benefit to small states, most 
                     
12Davis B. Bobrow and  Mark A. Boyer. “Maintaining System Stability: 
Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution  41  (December 1997): 729. 
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articles agreed that a strong belief that their status in 
the international community would be improved impelled many 
states to participate in operations. Though least supported 
by hard evidence, articles on regionalism and the increased 
participation of African states showed the potential 
benefits to the international community of repeated 
participation in United Nations Operations, whatever their 
reason for participation. A great deal of research has been 
done on reasons why states participate in United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations, but the opposite, what are the 
positive and adverse consequences of participation, does not 
generate as much attention. While the articles examined did 
provide hard evidence of significant materiel gain for 
participating nations, the intangibles of state legitimacy 
and increased stability of a state by repeated participation 
in a legitimate international system were briefly touched, 
but not investigated in depth. 
 As a starting point for the research included in this 
thesis, most previous literature has touched on the fact 
that materiel gains for participation in multinational 
operations are a recorded fact. The literature has also 
suggested that greater international military cooperation by 
small states may also provide benefits in terms of regional 
stability. This thesis will determine if suggested regional 
benefits exist, by measuring correlation of participation in 
multinational military operations and stability. The study, 
though conducted first as a singular block of all countries, 
is also divided regionally into the COCOMs of AFRICOM, 
CENTCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM to better identify trends of 
regional stabilization or destabilization. Individual 
reasons why states participate will not be investigated, 
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only the measurable effects and implications that said 
participation may have for state and regional stability. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 From a historical perspective, in the Middle East in 
general and Iraq specifically, previous state building 
efforts that included creation of an internally focused 
military had disastrous results. In light of the previous 
far-reaching negative results of Iraq’s domestically focused 
armed forces, and ongoing U.S.-led state building efforts, 
it is necessary to explore the possibility that the 
encouragement of an externally focused state security 
apparatus may improve state stability. Previous literature 
is fairly agreed that emerging states may gain excess 
defense articles, funding, and training through the 
participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and 
multinational coalitions. A natural relevant progression of 
previous research on peacekeeping operations is whether a 
correlation exists between state participation in 
multinational operations and improved state stability. Some 
aspects of state stability and cohesion are intangibles such 
as national identity, morale, acceptance of the rule of law 
without coercion, and international cooperation that are 
extremely difficult to measure. This study will review a 
wide variety of countries and will concentrate on three 
metrics of state stability; level of democracy, change in 





 In order to ensure wide inclusion of extremely varied 
countries, 84 countries from the areas of responsibility 
(AOR) of the U.S. Combatant Commands CENTCOM, AFRICOM, 
SOUTHCOM, and PACOM. EUCOM was excluded do to the proximity 
and wide membership within the European Union and NATO that 
may unduly influence trends of democratization and 
stability.  
 Within the countries included in the study, the 
countries of CENTCOM, most closely related to Iraq in 
culture, demographics, and geopolitical issues, received the 
greatest proportional representation. Of 20 countries in the 
CENTCOM AOR, 17 have been included in this study, 












PAKISTAN   
 
The only nations of CENTCOM specifically excluded are 
Afghanistan and Iraq as countries still nominally under or 
NATO occupation, as well as Lebanon due to fairly active 
continuing conflict with Hezbollah. 
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 After CENTCOM, the Unified Command most greatly 
proportionally represented is AFRICOM, with 36, or 67%, of 
54 countries.  
AFRICOM COUNTRIES 
ALGERIA GAMBIA NIGER 
ANGOLA GHANA NIGERIA 











MALAWI SOUTH AFRICA 




D. R. CONGO MOROCCO UGANDA 
ERITREA MOZAMBIQUE ZAMBIA 
ETHIOPIA NAMIBIA ZIMBABWE 
 
With a large number of countries gaining independence 
from European colonialism, many countries of multi-religious 
or ethnic demographics, and the both Islamic and Arabic 
heritage of North Africa, trends of AFRICOM, as in CENTCOM, 
may be relevant to Iraq. Of particular note, all countries 
of North and Saharan Africa are included. Somalia has been 
specifically excluded as a failed state that has not had an 
operational government since 1991. Similarly, Sudan, though 
possessing cultural and demographic similarities, is 
excluded specifically due to the active Darfur conflict 
resulting in continuing UN Peacekeeping intervention13.  
                     
13 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:  
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko (March 2009). 
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 The PACOM AOR is the least represented by proportion, 
with only 14 or 39% of 36 countries represented; however, 
the low proportion may be misleading. Specifically excluded 
are all countries with established military alliances with 
the U.S. extending to or before the Second World War; 
including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. 
Also excluded, with the exception of the Philippines and 
Indonesia, are all Indian and Pacific Ocean island and 
archipelagic federations. China has been excluded as a 
permanent member of the UN Security Council, and North Korea 
excluded as still being in a legal state of war, though in 











 Countries of the SOUTHCOM AOR are represented at 55%, 
with 17 of 31 countries included in the study. As in the 
case of PACOM, Caribbean Islands are excluded, with Haiti 
excluded specifically because of nearly continuous UN Peace 
Keeping Operations in country since 1993.14 Of mainland 
South and Central America, all countries but Suriname, 
Guyana, and French Guyana are included. 
 
 
                     
14 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: 
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C. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS INCLUDED 
 For the purposes of the study, multinational operations 
included may be divided into two categories: United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations and U.S.-led coalitions. United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations are fairly well documented, 
and a wealth of useful raw data is available on the United 
Nations Peacekeeping information page, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko, with information sheets on all 
past and present United Nations Peacekeeping Operations that 
include duration of operation, authorized troop strength, 
and participating nations. Though specific numbers of 
individual country troop contributions are included in some 
more recent Peacekeeping operations information sheets, 
troop levels by country are not available for all operations 
and will not be included within the scope of the study. As a 
starting point for operations, this study will include 
operations only after 1996, used as a starting reference 
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point as the end of UNISOM II, the United Nations 
Peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Only operations with 
greater than 500 total personnel authorized troop levels are 
counted. Countries are considered participants if they 
provide either military or police personnel to a selected 
peacekeeping operation. 
 
UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS 
OPERATION LOCATION DURATION 
MONAU  ANGOLA 1997-1999 
ONUB  BURUNDI 2004-2006 
MINURCA  CENTRAL AFRICAN 
REPUBLIC 
1998-2000 
UNMEE  ETHIOPIA/ERITREA 2000-2008 
UNAMSIL  SIERRA LEONE 1999-2005 
UNSMIH HAITI 1996-1997 
UNTAET  EAST TIMOR 1999-2002 
UNMISET  EAST TIMOR 2002-2005 
UNMIBH BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA 1995-2002 
UNTAES  CROATIA 1996-1998 
UNPREDEP  FMR YUG REP OF 
MACEDONIA 
1995-1999 
UNIKOM  IRAQ 1991-2003 
UNAMID  DARFUR, SUDAN 2008-2009 
UNMIS SUDAN 2005-2009 
UNOCI  COTE DIVOIRE 2004-2009 
UNMIL LIBERIA 2003-2009 
MONUC  DR CONGO 1999-2009 
MINUSTAH HAITI 2004-2009 
UNMIT  TIMOR LESTE 2006-2009 
UNFICYP  CYPRESS 1964-2009 
UNIFIL  LEBANON 1978-2009 
 
 For U.S.-led operations, four large ongoing operations 
and one recent no notice contingency operation will be 
included in the study. Ongoing operations are the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
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Afghanistan15, Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I)16, U.S. Fifth 
Fleet Combined Maritime Force (CMF)17, and U.S. SOUTHCOM’s 
Partnership of the Americas18. As an example of a large no-
notice contingency coalition, Operation Unified Assistance, 
the 2004-2005 Indian Ocean tsunami relief will also be 
considered19. Data on participating nations is taken 
directly from cognizant Combatant Commander public affairs 
releases of the individual operations.  
D. METRICS OF STABILITY 
 Change in state stability will be measured by three 
metrics, change in level of democracy, internal conflict, 
and external conflict. Change in level of democracy is taken 
from two respected sources of democracy assessments, the 
Bertelsmann Transformation index20, and Freedom House21. The 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index provides a fairly cohesive 
country score for the categories of Management Index and for 
Status Index. The change in country Status Index score is 
used in this study. The Bertelsmann Status Index score is a 
score from one to ten with one being lowest and ten highest. 
The score is a compilation of the averages of ten point 
                     
15 ISAF Contributing Nations: 
http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/nations/index.html (March 2009). 
16 2005-2009 Iraq Weekly Status Reports Archive: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/index.htm (March 2009). 
17 U.S. Fifth Fleet CMF page: 
http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/mission/rhumblines.html (March 2009). 
18 USSOUTHCOM Counter Drug information page: 
http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/counterNarco.php (March 2009). 
19 Operation Unified Assistance PAO release: 
http://www.pacom.mil/special/0412asia/ (March 2009). 
20 Bertelsmann Transformation Index: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
21 Freedom House Analysis: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=5 (March 2009). 
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scores for each of 12 subcategories within the Status Index 
divisions of Political Transformation and Economic 
Transformation.22 Bertelsmann Transformation Index data is 
available from 2003-2008. Freedom House also assigns scores 
of country democratic status by year. Freedom House assigns 
each country two scores, one being political rights and one 
being civil liberties. Each is given a score of one to 
seven, with one being highest and seven lowest. The scoring 
of the two categories is derived from a question checklist 
of 10 questions pertaining to Political Rights and 15 
pertaining to Civil Liberties. For the purposes of this 
study, both change in Political Rights and change in Civil 
Liberties are included.23 Though the Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index is more comprehensive, it includes only 
125 countries, with several countries of this study not 
evaluated, while Freedom House contains data on 193 
countries with all countries of this study evaluated. 
 Data for both internal and external conflicts is taken 
from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The Correlates of 
War Project was previously examined as a possible source of 
conflict data, but only includes completed data to 1997.24 
The Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, 
Oslo (UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset v4 – 2008 provides 
data on armed conflicts from 1946-2007, and is used as the 
primary reference for conflicts as a metric in this study. 
UCDP/PRIO defines armed conflict as “A contested 
                     
22 Bertelsmann Status Index methodology: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/37.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
23 Freedom House methodology: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008 
(March 2009). 
24 Correlates of War Available Datasets: 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/ (March 2009). 
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incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory 
where the use of armed force between two parties, at least 
one of which is a government of a state, results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths.”25  As such, required conflict 
data for the study for both numbers of internal and external 
conflict is contained in the UCDP/PRIO Conflict Dataset v4-
2008. For the purposes of the study, conflict data is 
limited only from 1996-2007, and broken into two portions: 
1996-2001, and 2002-2007. The difference in the number of 
internal and external conflicts between 2002-2007 and 1996-
2001 is considered the change in internal and external 
conflicts of a given state.        
E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DESIGN 
 Since the primary question of the thesis is whether a 
correlation exists between the independent variable of 
participation in multinational operations and dependent 
variables of the previously discussed state stability 
metrics, the question lends itself to systematic 
quantitative analysis. The study consists of five linear 
regressions of state stability metrics: change in the three 
measures of democracy, change in internal conflict, and 
change in external conflict versus the independent variable 
of the number of multinational operations of a given 
country. For change in level of democracy, one linear 
regression is performed for each standard of measure: change 
in Bertelsmann Status Index, change in Freedom House 
Political Rights score, and change in Freedom House Civil 
                     
25 UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook: Version 4-2008. Centre 
for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, 
Oslo (PRIO). Oslo, 2008, 3. 
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liberties score. Regressions of stability metrics versus 
multinational operation participation is performed using the 
SAS JMP7 software. Regressions are first performed on all 
countries of the study grouped together, then on countries 
divided by COCOM AOR in order to identify potential regional 
trends. 
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IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
A. RESULTS: ALL COUNTRIES 
When the results of regressions of the metrics of 
stability against number of multinational operations are 
viewed for all countries of the study as a cohesive block, 
several trends may be identified. Firstly, when all 
countries of the study are grouped together, a fairly strong 
correlation exists between participation in multinational 
operations from 1996-2008 and an improved Bertelsmann Status 
Index score for the period of 2003-2008. An estimated slope 
of .0398 exists between multinational operations and change 
in Bertelsmann status index exists. The coefficient 
indicates that on average, Bertelsmann Status Index will 
improve by .398 percent of the total Bertelsmann scale, per 
multinational operation in which a given country 
participates. The relationship between the x variable of 
total multinational operations and y variable of change in 
Bertelsmann Status Index also exhibits a probability of 
significance (prob > |t|) of >.0001. This means that the 
chance of the correlation between the two variables 
occurring randomly is approximately one in 10,000. Further 
reinforcing the relationship between multinational 
operations and Bertelsmann Status Index is the ratio of 
total variance versus variance explained26, expressed 
henceforth in this study as r². In the regression of 
multinational operations versus Bertelsmann Status Index, r² 
                     
26 Edward R. Tufte. Data Analysis for Politics and Policy. Prentice 
Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1974: 72. 
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is equal to.526, meaning that change in number of 
multinational operations explains 52.6 percent of change in 
Bertelsmann Status Index.   
 





















0 5 10 15 20
Total MN Ops  
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  0.0398179 0.008644 4.61 <.0001 
Figure 1 Bertelsmann Score:  All 
 
Of 16 countries with a recorded increase of greater 
than .75, or 7.5 percent of the total Bertelsmann scale, in 
their Bertelsmann Status Index score between 2003 and 2008, 
only two, Laos and Angola were not participants in any of 
the multinational operations included in the study. While a 
greater number had not participated in previous United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, all but Laos and Angola 
were currently involved in at least one current United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operation.  
  For the analysis of all countries as a group, an 
estimated slope of -.0029 exists between multinational 
operation participation and improved metrics of democracy as 
measured by Freedom House.  The correlation is extremely 
weak; for each multinational operation, Freedom House 
Political Rights score improves by only .04 percent of the 
  27
total scale. Additionally, the correlation’s probability of 
significance was greater than .802, meaning an 80 percent 
chance of the correlation occurring randomly.  
 
Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: All Countries 
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Term  Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  -0.002934 0.011699 -0.25 0.8026 
Figure 2 Freedom House Political Rights Index: All 
 
  Where a much stronger correlation may be seen is in the 
regression of multinational operations versus change in 
Freedom House Civil Liberties index. An estimated slope of -
.04 exists between multinational operations and civil 
liberties as recorded by Freedom House. The coefficient 
indicates that for every multinational operation, on 
average, Freedom House Civil Liberties Index improves by .5 
percent of the total scale. The probability of significance 
of this correlation is >.0001, meaning that chances of 
random occurrence of this correlation is approximately one 
in 10,000. The r² score for multinational operations versus 
Freedom House Political Rights score is .39, meaning that 
change in multinational operations explains 39 percent of 
change in Freedom House Political Rights Index. Despite the 
correlation discovered, it must also be noted that 
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throughout the 84 countries examined, 37 of 84 experienced 
an improvement in Freedom House Civil Rights Index, 
regardless of level multinational operations, while only six 
declined. Taken in conjunction with the r² figure that 
multinational operations explain only 39 percent of the 
variation, improvement in civil liberties may be a global 
trend, independent of participation in multinational 
operations. 
    
Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: All Countries 
























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  -0.041254 0.008883 -4.64 <.0001 
Figure 3 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: All  
 
When all countries are analyzed as a group, 
correlations between multinational operation participation 
and change in number of internal conflicts is fairly weak. 
The probability of significance, .29, indicates a 29 percent 
chance that the correlation occurred randomly. While the 
trend is toward a correlation between participation in 
multinational operations and a reduction in number of 
internal conflicts, the estimate of correlation is barely 
perceptible; -.0075. For comparison, were the correlation 
significant and predictive, a given country would need to 
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participate in 133 multinational operations to reduce their 
internal conflicts by one. The low estimated slope coupled 
with a high probability of the correlation occurring 
randomly indicates that on average, for all countries 
studied, multinational operations do not influence internal 
conflict.    
 































Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.007517 0.00708 -1.06 0.2914 
 
 
     
Figure 4 Internal Conflict:  All 
 
  A very slight correlation of -.005317 exists between 
participating in multinational operations and a reduction in 
number of external conflicts, but, as in the case of change 
in internal conflict, there is a low probability of 
significance. Though not as high a probability of random 
occurrence as in the case of internal conflict, probability 
is .0717, or a greater than 7 percent chance of random 
occurrence. Additionally the correlation of multinational 
operations and reduction in external conflict is inhibited 
by an extremely low n number. Within the scope of the study, 
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encompassing 84 countries over 12 years, only three 
interstate conflicts were recorded; Nigeria and Cameroon, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, and India and Pakistan. 
 





























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.005317 0.002915 -1.82 0.0717 
Figure 5 External Conflicts: All 
 
B. SEPARATED BY COCOM: CENTCOM 
  In order to identify regional trends, the countries of 
the study have also been divided by COCOM area of 
responsibility and regressions run again. As previously 
discussed, due to cultural, historical, and demographic 
similarities, the COCOM region most applicable to Iraq is 
CENTCOM. In the evaluation of the regression of 
multinational operations versus change in Bertelsmann Status 
Index, an estimated slope of .0307 is evident. 
Unfortunately, its probability of significance, .0656, 
indicates that the correlation is not significant, with a 

























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  0.0307407 0.015171 2.03 0.0656 
Figure 6 Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM 
 
Examination of raw data sets reveals that Pakistan is an 
extreme outlier, with participation in 19 of the included 
multinational operations, yet recording a decrease of -.09 
in Bertelsmann’s Status Index Number. Several theories 
present themselves as to the reasons for Pakistan’s outlier 
status. One explanation that occurs is that Pakistan and all 
South Asia may be outliers due to a regional peculiarity as 
in the case of the former French Indochina. This theory may 
be immediately refuted by examination of the other nations 
formerly comprising British India. Though Bangladesh is also 
an outlier, with many multinational operations yet still a 
decline in Bertelsmann Status Index, India and Sri Lanka are 
decidedly not. India’s performance tends to support the 
hypothesis of participation in multinational coalitions 
correlating with increase in democracy; India had the 
highest participation level in PACOM, and also the greatest 
Bertelsmann Status Index increase. Sri Lanka, also an active 
participant, recorded a Bertelsmann Status Index increase of 
.41. 
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  Another possible explanation for Pakistan’s outlier 
status is that unresolved disputes with India may have been 
used as a pretext for lack of democratization and 
suppression of civil liberties in the interest of military 
necessity. This explanation may also be disputed by 
comparison with India. India has been Pakistan’s opponent in 
said disputes, and if the disputes were the root cause of 
Pakistan’s outlier status, it would stand to reason that 
India would face similar problems. Instead, as previously 
mentioned, India is, of PACOM countries included in the 
study, the most supportive of the theory that multinational 
operations and metrics of state stability may be related. 
  A final possibility exists, that Pakistan’s decline in 
Bertelsmann Status Index between 2003 and 2008 is due to 
factors unique to Pakistan. A review of Bertelsmann’s 
Country Report for Pakistan reveals that much of the decline 
in score is due to the combination of the military rule of 
Pervez Musharraf beginning in 1999. Additionally, the 
perceived weakness of his government in the aftermath of the 
2005 earthquake and perceived catering to the U.S. created 
further dissent leading to justification for harsher 
security measures during Musharraf’s rule.27  
  Pakistan is the most significant outlier of the CENTCOM 
region, and when Pakistan is excluded from the regression, a 
different picture emerges. In the absence of Pakistan, the 
correlation between participating in multinational 
operations and increased Bertelsmann Status Index becomes 
more pronounced, with an estimated slope of .05. 
Additionally, probability of significance increase to a one 
                     
27 Bertelsmann 2009 Pakistan Country Report: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/119.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
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percent chance of the correlation being random. For this 
regression, r²is equal to .86, indicating that change in 
multinational operations explains 86 percent of variation in 
Bertelsmann Status Index.  
  Unfortunately, the regression of multinational 
operations versus increase in Bertelsmann Status Index has a 
low n  number that may affect results. With Pakistan 
excluded, the CENTCOM portion of the study includes 16 
countries, but for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab 
Emirates, no Bertelsmann data was available for 2003, with 
data for Qatar unavailable for 2008 as well. Due to the low 
n number for CENTCOM countries with complete Bertelsmann 
data, more weight should be lent to the Freedom House 
measures of democratization.  
 





















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  0.050815 0.017082 2.97 0.0126 
Figure 7 Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excl) 
 
  Evaluation of participation in multinational operations 
versus the Freedom House democracy metrics of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties reveals the CENTCOM region to 
mirror closely the results of all the study countries 
evaluated as a group. For total operations versus Freedom 
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House Political Rights Index, probability of significance 
was greater than .24, meaning a greater than 24 percent 
chance that the correlation occurs randomly.  
 
Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: CENTCOM 

























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  -0.015968 0.013084 -1.22 0.2400 
Figure 8 Freedom House Political Rights Index: CENTCOM 
 
  Correlation of level of participation in multinational 
operations and change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index 
registered an estimated slope of -.049, or a .7 percent 
improvement on the Freedom House Scale per operation. Unlike 
the correlation between multinational operations and 
Political Rights, probability of significance is much 
higher, .0348; only a three percent chance of the 
correlation occurring randomly. Additionally, r² for this 
regression is .57, meaning that change in multinational 
operations explains 57 percent of change in Freedom House 
Civil Liberties Index. The regression for Freedom House 
Civil Liberties was conducted with Pakistan included, and 
country data was available for all countries for the time 
period covered. As such, the regressions included all 17 
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CENTCOM cases, and may be more reliable than the low n 
number Bertelsmann regression. 
 
Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: CENTCOM 




















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Total MN Ops  -0.0499 0.021636 -2.31 0.0348 
Figure 9 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: CENTCOM 
 
  With respect to correlation of multinational operations 
and occurrence of internal conflict, correlation for the 
CENTCOM region appears slight. An extremely low probability 
of significance, .7381, indicates a 73 percent chance that 
this correlation occurred randomly. As in the case of 
multinational operations versus Bertelsmann Status Index for 
CENTCOM, review of raw data sets reveals Pakistan as an 
extreme outlier, with massive participation in multinational 
coalitions, but recording an increase of internal conflicts 
from the 2002-2008 period over the 1996-2001 period.  
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Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.005988 0.017596 -0.34 0.7381 
Figure 10 Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM 
 
When the regression of number multinational operations 
versus change internal conflict is performed with Pakistan 
excluded, still leaving 16 countries as included case 
studies, the correlation for CENTCOM region countries 
becomes pronounced and displays a much higher probability of 
significance. That probability was .044, meaning a four 
percent chance of random occurrence. Additionally, this 
regression’s r² is .59, indicating multinational operations 
explaining 59 percent of change in internal conflict. 
Lastly, with Pakistan excluded, CENTCOM becomes the only 
region in which correlation with reduction in internal 
conflict has probability of significance. 
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Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.039002 0.017737 -2.20 0.0440 
Figure 11 Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excluded) 
 
  The regression of number of multinational operations 
versus change in external conflicts revealed little. 
Possible correlation was not possible to ascertain for the 
entire region, including Pakistan. All countries included 
within the study showed no change in number of external 
conflicts between the 1996-2001 period and 2002-2008 period.  
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Figure 12 External Conflicts: CENTCOM 
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C. SEPARATED BY COCOM: AFRICOM 
  After CENTCOM, AFRICOM is next most applicable to Iraq. 
The AFRICOM region also provided the greatest number of 
countries to the study as a whole, with 36 countries out of 
the total 84. AFRICOM, with such a large portion of the 
countries included, was also a trendsetter. Of all the 
regions included in the study, AFRICOM by far had the 
strongest correlation between number of multinational 
operations participated in by a given state and improvement 
in Bertelsmann Status Index. Additionally, the correlation 
identified had the highest probability of significance of 
any region. AFRICOM also included two major outliers. 
Senegal, though boasting participation in 13 of the included 
multinational operations, had a drop of .27 in Bertelsmann 
status index between 2003 and 2008. At the opposite end of 
the spectrum, Sierra Leone, holding the highest increase in 
Bertelsmann Status Index of any country, an increase of 
2.24, or 22 percent of the Bertelsmann scale, participated 
in only three of the operations included in the study. 
Despite Sierra Leone’s low level of participation overall, 
all three operations are ongoing operations, and account for 
33 percent of current United Nations Peacekeeping 
operations. An explanation to Sierra Leone’s fairly rapid 
democratization and entrance to the international community 
may be the end of the civil war with the Revolutionary 
United Front in 2000.28 Review of Bertelsmann’s Sierra Leone 
information page reveals this to be the case.29 
                     
28 Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo 
(UCDP/PRIO) Armed Conflict Dataset v4 – 2008. 




With respect to Senegal, Bertelsmann’s Senegal country 
report reveals that the decline in scores was due primarily 
to government corruption specific to Senegal. Despite 
corruption leading to a decline of scores, the report also 
stated that Senegal’s rule of law and democratic 
institutions were more stable than the norm for sub-Saharan 
Africa.30 
 AFRICOM, with the highest n number of cases of any 
individual region, shows a estimated slope of .0746 between 
participation in multinational military coalitions and 
change in Bertelsmann Status Index. As in the case of all 
countries together, the probability of significance, .0001, 
indicates a one in 10,000 chance of the correlation 
occurring randomly. This correlation has an r² of .68, 
meaning change in number of multinational operations 
explaining 68 percent of change in Bertelsmann Status Index. 
 


























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  0.0746353 0.016971 4.40 0.0001 
Figure 13 Bertelsmann Score: AFRICOM 
 
                     
30 Bertelsmann 2009 Senegal Country Report: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/82.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
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  In the regressions of multinational operations versus 
the Freedom House metrics of democracy: political rights and 
civil liberties, AFRICOM showed some of the strongest trends 
with highest probability of significance. AFRICOM’s average 
improvement in political rights per multinational operation 
was the highest of any COCOM AOR. Additionally; AFRICOM was 
the only region where the regression of total operations 
versus change in political rights showed a high probability 
of significance, .0355, indicating that 3.5 percent chance 
of random occurrence of correlation. As such, AFRICOM, with 
the highest n number of cases, represents significant 
correlation between increased participation in multinational 
military coalitions and improvements of all measures of 
democracy used in this study. This finding would tend to 
support the previously discussed conclusions of Cleaver and 
May that African regional stability would benefit from 
greater formalization of African international military 
cooperation.  
 
Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: AFRICOM 






















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.042025 0.019211 -2.19 0.0355 
Figure 14 Freedom House Political Rights Index: AFRICOM 
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  Total operations versus change in civil liberties for 
the AFRICOM region also stood out among all other COCOMs. 
AFRICOM showed the greatest improvement in civil liberties 
per multinational operation participated in of any region, a 
estimated slope of -.0572, or improvement of .5 percent of 
the Freedom House scale per multinational operation. 
Probability of significance, .007 or a seven in 10,000 
chance of random occurrence, was higher than that of any 
other region. 
 
Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: AFRICOM 
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Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.057215 0.015466 -3.70 0.0007 
Figure 15 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: AFRICOM 
 
For AFRICOM, the only metric of stability that did not 
show a high probability of significance of correlation was 
change in occurrence of internal conflict. Change in 
internal conflict versus multinational operations was for 
AFRICOM, as for all other COCOMs with the exception of 
CENTCOM when Pakistan is excluded, barely perceptible, with 
a coefficient of -0.011. It had very low probability of 
significance, .37; a 37 percent chance of random occurrence. 
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Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.011139 0.012473 -0.89 0.3779 
Figure 16 Internal Conflicts: AFRICOM 
 
  Change in number of external conflicts versus 
multinational operations showed a greater correlation than 
that of internal conflicts for AFRICOM, with a fairly high 
probability of correlation significance. There is 
unfortunately a problem of low n number of conflicts; there 
were only two interstate wars in the AFRICOM region within 
the period and countries covered. As such, conclusions of 
the multinational operations versus change in external 
conflict regression will most likely not provide decisive 
results for any region. It should be noted though that those 
conflicts account for two of three interstate wars and four 
of six belligerent countries within the entire scope of all 
countries included in the study. 
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Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.014684 0.007191 -2.04 0.0487 
Figure 17 External Conflicts: AFRICOM 
 
D. SEPARATED BY COCOM: PACOM 
  As a regional grouping, the PACOM AOR may be described 
as an entire region that is an outlier from the other 
regions examined. Of all regions in the study, PACOM 
displayed the weakest correlation between participation in 
multinational operations and an improvement in Bertelsmann 
Status Index score. These results may be due to outliers of 
two categories.  
  First affecting results are frequent participants in 
Southeast Asia with declining Bertelsmann Status scores 
despite significant multinational operation participation. 
Singapore, participating in six operations showed a decrease 
in Bertelsmann Status Index of .03, and Bangladesh, one of 
the most active participants in the study, with 
participation in 18 of 27 total operations, showed a 
decrease of .27. Thailand, participating in nine of the 
included operations, registered a Status Index decrease of 
.83, the second greatest decrease out of all countries with 
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Bertelsmann Status Index data available from 2003-2008. In 
reviewing specific Bertelsmann Country Reports for reasons 
for the Bertelsmann ranking of these countries, reasons for 
decline unique to each country are revealed, rather than 
regional trend. The largest reason cited in Bertelsmann’s 
Country Report for Bangladesh’s decline is aggressive 
government and military security measures to combat Islamic 
based militants.31 When conducting a study applicable to 
stabilization of Iraq, this may seem disconcerting. However, 
two of the PACOM countries with some of the largest Islamic 
based militancy problems in the region, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, do not support that this is a universal trend. 
Indonesia and the Philippines were both active in a diverse 
array of multinational military coalition operations, and 
recorded .47 and .45 increase, respectively, in Bertelsmann 
Status Index. Thailand’s decline in Status Index was stated 
in the Bertelsmann country report to be primarily due to 
government corruption of Prime Minister Thaksin, and 
resultant military opposition to him.32 Singapore’s decline, 
albeit fairly slight at .03, was justified by Bertelsmann’s 
fairly unambiguously as  
The city-state of Singapore and its thriving free 
market show tremendous economic success, but its 
political system is authoritarian and lacks 
genuinely democratic institutions. The Singapore 
government makes no secret of the fact that it 
considers Western-style democracy unsuitable for 
 
 
                     
31 Bertelsmann 2009 Bangladesh Country Report: 
http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/123.0.html?&L=1 (March 
2009). 
32Bertelsmann 2009 Thailand Country Report: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/126.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
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itself as a small city-state fighting for 
survival in an inhospitable and competitive 
environment.33 
This would indicate that for Singapore, as in the case of 
Bangladesh and Thailand, Bertelsmann’s recording of a 
decline in Status Index was due to country specific 
eccentricities, rather than a regional or larger trend. 
  At the opposite end of the outlier spectrum, all 
countries formerly comprising French Indochina — Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia —; showed significant increases in 
Bertelsmann Status Index, despite very little multinational 
operation participation. Vietnam and Laos both increased by 
greater than .5, or by 5% of the total Bertelsmann scale and 
participated in none of the multinational operations 
included in the study. Cambodia, with a .18 increase in 
Bertelsmann status index score, participated in one 
operation included in the study. According to Bertelsmann’s 
country information pages, cited reasons for increases of 
Status Index in former Indochina countries fell mainly in 
two categories; applicable to all three countries, and 
Cambodia specific. Reasons specific to Cambodia included the 
end of Khmer Rouge and Cambodian Freedom Fighters 
insurgencies. All three countries exhibited a greater desire 
for economic cooperation and integration in greater 
Southeast Asia.34 
  Estimated slope is low, .0107, meaning a one tenth of 
one percent increase in the total Bertelsmann scale per 
multinational operation. The correlation displayed the 
                     
33Bertelsmann 2009 Singapore Country Report: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/129.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
34Bertelsmann 2009 Asia and Oceana Report: http://www.bertelsmann-
transformation-index.de/457.0.html?&L=1 (March 2009). 
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lowest probability of significance of any region, .42, 
meaning a 42 percent chance that any correlation occurred 
randomly.  
 






















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  0.0107487 0.013133 0.82 0.4278 
Figure 18 Bertelsmann Score: PACOM 
 
  PACOM also showed significant regional outlier status 
with respect to change in Freedom House Political Rights 
Index. Of the regions encompassed by the study, PACOM was 
the only region to show a correlation between participation 
in multinational operations and an average decrease in 
political rights. Also of note, in addition to merely the 
existence of the correlation between participating in 
multinational operations and an average decrease in 
political rights, the correlation’s probability of 
significance, .04 or four percent chance of random 
occurrence, means that the correlation is significant. The 
r², .86, indicates that increase in multinational operations 
explains 86 percent of the decrease in political rights. 
These factors combined would indicate that in PACOM, greater 
participation in multinational operations inhibits political 
rights. Another plausible explanation may be that the result 
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stems from the combination of PACOM’s low n number of cases, 
and the large percentage of outliers. 
 
Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: PACOM 


























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  0.059492 0.026546 2.24 0.0431 
Figure 19 Freedom House Political Rights Index: PACOM 
 
  PACOM countries did show a similarity to other regions 
in multinational operations versus Freedom House Civil 
Liberties index, but correlation was still somewhat weak, at 
only -.018. The probability of significance, .284, indicates 
that this correlation is not significant at all, and had a 
28 percent chance of occurring randomly. 
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Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: PACOM 




















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.018717 0.01678 -1.12 0.2849 
Figure 20 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: PACOM 
 
  In possible correlation of operations versus conflict, 
PACOM displayed more similarities to the trend of other 
regions. PACOM showed a correlation between multinational 
operations and an overall reduction in internal conflict. 
Correlation was extremely weak, at -.008, with an extremely 
low probability of significance.  The probability of 
significance, .65, indicates a 65 percent chance that any 
correlation at all occurred randomly. No PACOM countries 
reflected a change in external conflicts. 
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Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.008021 0.017423 -0.46 0.6528 
Figure 21 Internal Conflicts: PACOM 
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Figure 22 External Conflicts: PACOM 
 
 Overall, as a region PACOM was least supportive of the 
hypothesis that participation in multinational military 
operations may be linked to one or more metrics of 
stability. The region was first hindered by a marginal to 
low n number of cases, 14 of the total 84. Additionally, the 
region included six major outliers, divided into two 
diametrically opposed groups of three: active participants 
whose stability declined, and non-participants whose 
stability improved. 
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E. SEPARATED BY COCOM: SOUTHCOM 
  SOUTHCOM as a region, with 17 of the total 84 cases, 
tended to follow the trends of the study as a whole, but was 
unique in that none of the correlations displayed high 
probability indicating significance. SOUTHCOM showed a 
correlation of .027 for participation in multinational 
operations and improvement in democracy according to the 
Bertelsmann Status Index. Unfortunately, probability of 
significance, .0674, indicates that this correlation is not 
significant, and had a six percent chance of occurring 
randomly.  
 





















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  0.0276837 0.013963 1.98 0.0674 
Figure 23 Bertelsmann Score: SOUTHCOM 
 
  With respect to Freedom House measures of democracy, 
political rights and civil liberties, SOUTHCOM showed 
correlation but with even lower probability of significance 
than correlation with change in Bertelsmann Status Index. 
The probability of significance of .81 means that there is 
an 81 percent chance that any correlation at all occurred 
randomly.  
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Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: SOUTHCOM 


























Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.006116 0.026429 -0.23 0.8199 
Figure 24 Freedom House Political Rights Index: SOUTHCOM 
 
  Correlation of participating in multinational 
operations and increase in civil liberties was more defined, 
-.03, but still not significant. The figure of .06 still 
indicates that the correlation is not significant. 
 
Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: SOUTHCOM 






















Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.034659 0.017527 -1.98 0.0655 
Figure 25 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: SOUTHCOM 
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 Correlation of participating in multinational 
operations and change in number of conflicts was also 
equivocal. Number of operations showed a barely perceptible 
correlation, .001, with a decrease in internal conflicts, 
but with extremely high, 89 percent, possibility of random 
occurrence. No SOUTHCOM countries participated in interstate 
wars during the time period encompassed by the study.  
 
Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: SOUTHCOM  
 
Parameter Estimates 
Term   Estimated slope Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
TOTAL MN OPS  -0.001019 0.007978 -0.13 0.8999 
Figure 26 Internal Conflicts: SOUTHCOM 
  
 
Total Ops vs  Change in External Conflicts: SOUTHCOM  
 
Figure 27 External Conflicts: SOUTHCOM 
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ALL  0.526*  0.29  0.39*  0.24  0.22 
CENTCOM  0.869  0.722*  0.57  0.67  NA 
PAKISTAN 
EXCLUDED 
0.86*  NA  NA  0.59*  NA 
AFRICOM   0.68*  0.36*  0.48*  0.32  0.45 
PACOM  0.403  0.868*  0.63  0.47  NA 
SOUTHCOM  0.728  0.545  0.68  0.33  NA 
*Statistically Significant: Prob>|t| .05 or less 































































ALL  74*  84  84*  84  84 
CENTCOM  13  17*  17*  17  17 
PAKISTAN 
EXCLUDED 
12*  16  16  16*  16 
AFRICOM   32*  36*  36*  36  36 
PACOM  14  14*  14  14  14 
SOUTHCOM  15  17  17  17  17 
*Statistically Significant: Prob>|t| .05 or less 
Figure 29 Number of Observations by Regression 
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS FROM RESULTS OF ANALYSIS 
 From the results of the regressions of level of 
participation in multinational operations versus metrics of 
stability several conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, and 
most pronounced, a strong correlation with extremely high 
probability of significance exists between participation in 
multinational operations and an increase in state level of 
democracy as measured by the Bertelsmann Status index. With 
all countries included, an n number of 84, the correlation 
has approximately a one in 10,000 chance of random 
occurrence. Also highly significant is the fact that based 
on the r² figure of this regression, 52 percent of change in 
Bertelsmann Status Index may be explained by change in level 
of participation in multinational coalitions. The glaring 
implication is that level of democracy and rule of law, at 
least as recorded by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, 
is likely to increase as a given state increases their 
participation in multinational operations. 
 Participation in multinational operations was not only 
correlated to increased democratization according to only 
one source either. Improvement in Civil Liberties index as 
recorded by Freedom House also showed a strong correlation 
with multinational military operations, also with 
approximately a one in 10,000 chance of random occurrence. 
Though the r², .39, is not nearly as high as correlation 
between multinational operations and Bertelsmann Status 
Index, the 39 percent of variance explained by change in 
level of participation is still a significant finding.  
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 Correlation with Freedom House Political Rights index 
was nearly nonexistent. In all regions except AFRICOM, the 
slight correlations were not significant. That said, 
AFRICOM, the region with the highest n number of cases of 
any region, showed significant correlations between levels 
of multinational military operations and improvement in all 
measures of democratization. As previously stated, this 
finding supports the conclusions of Cleaver and May that 
Africa as a region will reap benefits in stability of more 
formalized structures of international cooperation. CENTCOM 
also showed significant correlation between improvement in 
civil rights and levels of multinational operations. 
However, with the outlier, Pakistan, excluded significant 
correlation also existed, lack of Bertelsmann data in 2003 
for four Gulf States created a low n number. Three of those 
four countries are now included in the Bertelsmann 
transformation index, and at least two, Kuwait and Qatar are 
active participants or supporters to U.S.-led coalitions. As 
such, future research should continue to follow the change 
in Bertelsmann Status Index of these newly included 
countries. Overall, it may be very accurately stated that in 
researching possible correlation between participation in 
multinational operations and improvement of democracy a 
strong correlation was discovered. The correlation existed, 
with possibility of random occurrence measured in hundredths 
of one percent, in two out of three respected measures of 
democracy. Additionally, when the countries of the study 
were broken into regions the correlation was strongest in 
the two regions most applicable to Iraq.     
 Internal and external conflicts as metrics of state 
stability did not produce as overwhelming results as 
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democratization did. Occurrence of external conflict was 
particularly difficult, as in the 12 years covered by this 
study, only three interstate wars were recorded among the 84 
case studies. Due to the extremely low n number; no results 
can be determined for possible correlation of levels of 
multinational military cooperation and occurrence of 
interstate wars. 
 With respect to correlation between participation in 
multinational operations and the stability metric of 
internal conflict, the result was also fairly clear, namely 
that for the majority of regions examined correlation did 
not exist. With all 84 countries grouped together, 
correlation was barely perceptible, and chance of random 
occurrence was extremely high. Divided by COCOM AOR, three 
of four regions also mirrored this result. What is 
significant though is that when Pakistan is excluded as an 
extreme outlier, CENTCOM, with 16 other cases besides 
Pakistan, becomes the only region where a strong and 
significant correlation may be seen between level of 
multinational operation participation and a reduction in 
internal conflicts. This correlation also showed a high r² 
figure of .59, meaning that 59 percent of change in level of 
internal conflicts could be explained by change in level of 
multinational operations. It must also be noted that 
although not all regions other than CENTCOM showed strong or 
significant correlation between multinational operations and 
decrease of internal conflict, in no region was there any 
correlation, even insignificant, with an increase of 
internal conflict. 
 Despite highly significant findings of correlation 
between multinational military operations and metrics of 
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stability, several criticisms emerge. Criticisms of the 
study may be classified in three categories: duration, n  
number of cases, and diversification of data sources. 
Firstly, a possible criticism is duration. The time period 
encompassed in this study is only 1996-2008. Though a time 
period of great upheaval and change on the world stage, the 
12 years of this study represent approximately one-fifth the 
time period that UN Peacekeeping Operations have taken 
place. A recommendation for future research would be to 
extend the time frame covered back to 1949, and include all 
United Nations and U.S.-led coalitions in that time period. 
Bertelsmann Transformation Index Data, beginning in 2003, 
may not be extended back farther, but may be followed 
forward in future research to record changes in countries, 
particularly the four Gulf States, for which data was 
unavailable in 2003. 
 Another potential criticism, at least for AORs other 
than AFRICOM, may be n number of cases. CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM 
both had 17 country cases, but PACOM, with only 14 cases, 
faced a low n number problem in each regression, compounded 
by a large number of outliers. To correct in future research 
a strong recommendation would be merely to rerun the study 
including all countries in the world for which all or a 
majority of required data exists. The inclusion of all 
countries would eliminate n a number problems, and confirm 
or deny whether the trend of increased democratization 
following increased participation multinational operations 
holds true worldwide. The inclusion of all countries and an 
expansion of duration of study may also assist in the low 
number problem of interstate wars, so that a more accurate  
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determination of correlation may be made between 
participation in multinational operations and occurrence of 
external conflict. 
 A last criticism may be diversification of sources. 
Though democratization as a metric of stability was measured 
by two respected sources, the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index and Freedom House, data for conflicts, internal and 
external, came from only one source, the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program. A wealth of information may be found in the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program, but future research would 
benefit from a diversification of sources of conflict data 
for comparison. An excellent source of conflict data for 
future research would be the Correlates of War Project, when 
data through 2008 is released and becomes available.  
 Despite valid potential criticisms, the findings of the 
study, particularly with respect to correlation of 
multinational operations and increased levels of democracy, 
have serious implications. First and foremost, the high 
level and significance of correlation should be a signal 
that further research and continuance of this subject is 
highly warranted. Secondly, the findings do in fact have 
policy implications for state building in Iraq. 
B. PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS BY IRAQ AND 
STATED U.S. DEFENSE POLICY 
 For all countries, the study determined that on 
average, increased levels of participation in multinational 
military coalitions contributes to increased 
democratization. For Iraq’s AOR, CENTCOM, this correlation 
of multinational operations improved metrics of stability 
also extends to reduced numbers of internal conflict. This 
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in conjunction with the established fact of materiel gains 
for multinational coalition participation makes a compelling 
case that one way to bolster improvement and stabilization 
in Iraq may be to encourage greater participation as soon as 
is feasible. Also adding to this argument is the fact that 
on the whole, there was not even a correlation, much less 
causation, between increased multinational operations and a 
reduction in stability.  In short, encouraging Iraq to 
participate in multinational coalitions and United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations would most likely produce no adverse 
results, but has an excellent chance of producing one or 
more positive results.  
 Furthermore, inclusion of Iraq in multinational 
operations, independent of potential benefits to Iraq very 
much supports the intentions of official U.S. Defense 
Policy. Speaking specifically to U.S. strategy and policy in 
the Global War on Terrorism, the 2008 National Defense 
Strategy States the need for inclusion of allies fairly 
explicitly: 
In concert with others, we seek to reduce support 
for violent extremism and encourage moderate 
voices, offering a positive alternative to the 
extremists’  vision for the future. Victory 
requires us to apply all elements of national 
power in partnership with old allies and new 
partners.35 
The passage makes fairly clear that “new partners” will play 
an essential role in the Secretary of Defense’s vision of 
the Global War on Terrorism. The Secretary’s vision is 
                     
35The Honorable Robert M. Gates (ed.) “National Defense Strategy.” 
USDOD Publication. June 2008, 8. 
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further expanded in the section entitled “Strengthen and 
Expand Alliances and Partnerships,” stating, 
The United States also must strengthen and expand 
alliances and partnerships. The U.S. alliance 
system has been a cornerstone of peace and 
security for more than a generation and remains 
the key to our success, contributing 
significantly to achieving all U.S. objectives. 
Allies often possess capabilities, skills,  and 
knowledge we cannot duplicate. We should not 
limit ourselves to the relationships of the past. 
We must  broaden our ideas to include 
partnerships for new situations or circumstances, 
calling on moderate voices in troubled regions 
and unexpected partners.36 
Focus on calling on “unexpected partners” fits the situation 
of Iraq very well. Even in the absence of further evidence 
of a causal relationship between multinational operations 
and state stability, the inclusion of Iraq in such 
operations and initiatives as Iraq’s armed services become 
more capable meets the officially stated guidance of the 
Secretary of Defense.  Inclusion of Iraq’s armed forces  in 
multinational operations  may provide a two-pronged attack, 
both meeting the Secretary’s guidance of the need for 
greater reliance on new “unexpected partners,” and also 
potentially furthering U.S. goals of stability in Iraq.  
 Despite the theoretical nature benefits to the National 
Defense Strategy of the inclusion of Iraq, the fact remains 
that Iraq has already been included in at least one theater 
of multinational operations. The 2007 Maritime Strategy 
states: 
Expanded cooperative relationships with other 
nations will contribute to the security and 
                     
36 Gates, 15. 
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stability of the maritime domain for the benefit 
of all. Although our forces can surge when 
necessary to respond to crises, trust and 
cooperation cannot be surged.37 
The 2007 Global Maritime Strategy’s posture on international 
cooperation and its application to Iraq is highly 
significant for an extremely important reason; at the time 
of the strategy’s publication, multinational operations had 
been underway between the Fifth Fleet’s Combined Maritime 
Force and Iraq’s Navy for greater than three years. Greater 
inclusion of Iraq in multinational maritime operations as a 
means of greater international inclusion for Iraq has 
several advantages. First and foremost, as previously 
stated, real world combined operations including Iraq’s Navy 
are and have been underway for nearly five years. Secondly, 
perceived importance of maritime security is high to Iraq, 
as the majority of Iraq’s economy is based on overseas sale 
of oil. Lastly, a framework for integration of emerging 
states into an effective maritime coalition already exists 
in the U.S. Fifth Fleet’s Combined Maritime Force. A strong 
recommendation that would most likely not cause harm, and 
may bring about large returns would be the widening of the 
already existing inclusion of Iraq’s Navy in Fifth Fleet 
maritime security operations, even outside of the Arabian 
Gulf as soon as is feasible. 
 
                     
37 General James Conway, Admiral Gary Roughead, Admiral Thad Allen 
(ed.). “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.” USDOD 
Publication. October 2007, 11. 
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C.  PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS BY IRAQ AND 
STATED IRAQ DEFENSE POLICY 
 In addition to greater participation by Iraq in 
multinational operations supporting the intent of U.S. 
Department of Defense Guidance, greater participation also 
fulfills intent of Iraq’s National Security Strategy. A 
significant portion of Iraq’s National Security Strategy is 
dedicated to cooperation with other nations and Iraq’s role 
in the international community. One section, specifically 
entitled “Reinforcing the participation of Iraq in the 
United Nations and international fora,” gives insight that 
if Iraq were asked by the United Nations to contribute 
forces, initially in small numbers, to Peacekeeping, such 
request might be met favorably. The statements, “Iraq is an 
active and founding member of the United Nations. Iraq has 
substantial international commitments and active 
participation is one of the bases of the United Nations,”38 
and section (d) thereof, “Participation in all the 
international organizations that respect the Iraqi people as 
part of the United Nations,”39 suggest that requests for 
greater participation in United Nations operations and 
initiatives might even be viewed as a matter of national 
pride. Because of said evidence that that increased 
international military participation might be viewed 
favorably by Iraq, a recommendation may be made that through 
diplomatic channels, Iraq might be approached about sending 
initially small numbers of volunteer military and police 
personnel to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The 
                     
38 Republic of Iraq Cabinet. Iraq First: Iraqi National Security 
Strategy. Baghdad: 2007, 20-21. 
39 Republic of Iraq Cabinet, 21.  
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existing communication structure under the Fifth Fleet 
Combined Maritime Force also provides a channel by which 
Iraq could be approached with regards to expansion of 
multinational military participation.  
 Above all, the need for greater inclusion of Iraq in 
multinational coalition operations in as timely a manner as 
possible cannot be overstated. Regardless of the results of 
this study, inclusion of Iraq in such operations supports 
official policy of both the U.S. and Iraq. Beyond support of 
policy, it is also, as recorded by previous literature, a 
means of procuring funding, materiel, and effective 
training. Lastly, the results of this study do support that 
on average, participation in multinational military 
coalitions does positively affect democratization. In 
CENTCOM, participation positively affects incidence of 
internal conflict as well. It is by no means a certainty 
that Iraq’s participation in such operations would rapidly 
affect the country’s stability, but the examination of that 
ambiguity produces a fairly well defined cost benefit 
choice. It is highly unlikely that such participation would 
cause any harm, and highly likely that such participation 
would be of great benefit, to Iraq, to the U.S., and to the 
CENTCOM region. 
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